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Quarter-end effects in banks:  
Preferred habitat or window dressing? 
 
Vladimir Kotomin 
University of Wisconsin – Eau Claire 
 
Drew B. Winters 
Texas Tech University 
 
Abstract 
Allen and Saunders (1992) document abnormal behavior of bank assets and liabilities at 
the turn-of-the-quarter and attribute it to window dressing by banks. Using different 
methods we re-visit bank turn-of-the-quarter balance sheet activity.  We also examine 
quarter-end changes in the effective fed funds rates and fed funds rate standard 
deviations.  We confirm the presence of turn-of-the-quarter activity on bank balance 
sheets and in the fed funds market.  However, we conclude that the turn-of-the-quarter 
effects are more consistent with customer preferred habitats than window dressing.  
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1. Introduction 
Musto (1997) examines weekly averages of daily one-month commercial paper rates at 
the year-end and finds that the average rate over the last week of the year is higher than 
the average rate over the first week of the year.  Musto attributes the year-end rate pattern 
to flight-from-risk window dressing by money fund managers.  Griffiths and Winters 
(2004) re-visit the year-end rate pattern in commercial paper using different methods and 
show that the timing of the rate changes at the year-end is not consistent with window 
dressing.  They suggest that the timing of the rate changes is consistent with a year-end 
preferred habitat for liquidity.  They find the rate pattern is common across one-month 
money market instruments.   
A year-end preferred habitat for liquidity suggests that lenders withdraw from the 
money markets at the end of the year when the maturity of the instrument begins to span 
the lenders’ year-end cash obligation dates (driving up interest rates) and instead hold 
cash (typically in the form of demand deposits) to meet their year-end obligations.  After 
the year-end obligations are covered, lenders return to the money markets (driving down 
interest rates).  Because year-end obligations are not all due on the last day of the year the 
decline in rates from lenders returning to the market need not align with the last day of 
the year.  In fact, Griffiths and Winters (2004) show that the decline in rates typically 
starts a few days before the end of the year. 
Allen and Saunders (1992) examine bank balance sheets and find that bank assets 
are higher at quarter-ends than the average across the last month of quarter. They also 
find that banks increase their purchased funds at quarter-end, which they suggest supports 
active quarter-end balance sheet management by banks, i.e. window dressing.  We re-
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visit the issue of bank balance sheet window dressing using different methods and find 
little support for window dressing.  Specifically, we examine the timing of changes in 
bank balance sheet accounts around quarter-ends and find that the timing of the changes 
relative to the end of the quarter is not consistent with window dressing.  Instead, our 
results suggest that bank quarter-end activity is most consistent with banks responding to 
customer quarter-end holdings of cash in the form of demand deposits.  Griffiths and 
Winters (2004) find increased levels of demand deposits in association with the year-end 
preferred habitat in the money market. 
 
2.   A Review of Allen and Saunders’ (1992) Methods and Results 
Allen and Saunders (1992) examine bank balance sheet data for evidence of window 
dressing.  They state that window dressing can be active (endogenous, bank initiated) or 
passive (exogenous, customer initiated) and that they are looking at active window 
dressing.  They also divide bank initiated window dressing into upward window dressing 
and downward window dressing with upward and downward relating to the direction of 
the change in bank total assets.   
Allen and Saunders state that window dressing is a temporary deviation from a 













=           (1) 
where 
 Aend,t =  total assets on the last day of the quarter t and 
 Aavg,t =  average total assets over the last month of the quarter t. 
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Using equation (1), Allen and Saunders find that bank total assets increase significantly at 
quarter-ends.  For this increase to support window dressing it must be temporary, and 
Allen and Saunders find evidence that the increase in total assets at quarter-ends is 
reversed in the following month.1   Allen and Saunders state that the increase in total 
assets is consistent with upward window dressing.   
 Next, Allen and Saunders examine the liability side of the balance sheet to 
determine if the increase in total assets is bank initiated or is a response to customer 
activities.  They suggest that an increase in purchased funds would support bank initiated 
window dressing while an increase in retail accounts would support customer initiated 
activity.   They find that fed funds and repo purchases increase significantly at quarter-
ends.  In addition, among the liabilities that increase at the quarter-end, the increase in fed 
funds and repo purchases is the increase that is most highly correlated with the increase 
in bank assets.  The increase in a liability account that is least correlated with the increase 
in total assets is the increase in retail deposit accounts.  Because fed funds and repo 
purchases are bank initiated transactions while the retail accounts are customer initiated, 
the evidence supports active window dressing by banks.   
To determine if the activity in the fed funds market is significant, Allen and 
Saunders examine fed funds rates around quarter-ends and find the fed funds rates 
increase by 22 basis points in the last day of the quarter and fall by 18 basis points on the 
first day of the quarter.  This suggests the presence of significant temporary buying 
pressure in the fed funds market on the last day of the quarter. 
 















 In summary, using deviations from averages, Allen and Saunders find that bank 
total assets increase significantly at quarter-ends and the increase is temporary.  Further 
they find that the increase in total assets appears to be funded with purchased liabilities.  
Accordingly, Allen and Saunders conclude that banks are actively window dressing their 
balance sheets.   
 
3. Reasons to Re-visit Bank Window Dressing 
The recent research on the year-end effect in the commercial paper market provides two 
reasons to re-visit the results from Allen and Saunders.  First, Griffiths and Winters 
(2004) show that using averages hides the timing of changes around quarter-ends and that 
the specific timing of changes is important in determining if window dressing exists.  
Second, Griffiths and Winters find that the year-end rate increase in one-month 
commercial paper is common across one-month private-issue money market securities 
and that the pattern is consistent with a year-end preferred habitat for liquidity.  In other 
words, money market investors withdraw from the money markets prior to the year-end 
and hold cash (or demand deposits) to meet their year-end cash obligations.  In addition, 
Griffiths and Winters find that demand deposits increase significantly in December (by 
about $17 billion) and decline significantly in January.  The increase in demand deposits 
is a customer initiated increase in bank liabilities which could lead to a temporary 
increase in bank assets.  Given the recent evidence that money market investors appear to 
prefer holding cash in the form of demand deposits at the year-end, we feel that it is 
appropriate to re-visit bank balance sheet changes around quarter-ends using methods 
focused on identifying the timing of changes. 
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4.  Data 
Allen and Saunders (1992) conclude that banks are actively window dressing because the 
banks increase purchases of fed funds and repos, and the purchases are highly correlated 
with the increase in bank total assets.  As support, they report an increase in the fed funds 
rate on the last day of the quarter.   
Since Allen and Saunders lean heavy on the activity in the fed funds market to 
support their conclusion of active window dressing by banks, we begin our analysis with 
an examination of quarter-ends in the fed funds market to determine whether quarter-ends 
are unusual.  To begin this analysis, we collect daily standard deviations of the fed funds 
rate from January 3, 1994 through December 31, 2002 from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York.  This sample period covers all the daily standard deviation data that is 
available from the Fed.  For consistency we constrain the sample period for all of our 
data to this sample period.  This period includes 36 quarter-ends.   In addition to the daily 
standard deviation in the fed funds rate, we also collect the effective (volume-weighted) 
fed funds rate series. The daily fed funds rate data are collected by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York and are available from the web site of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis. 
To examine bank balance sheet activity, we collect weekly data series (not 
seasonally adjusted) for various aggregate asset and liability categories of commercial 
banks in the U.S. (reported every Wednesday). The balance sheet data come from the 
Board of Governors’ H8 report and are available from the Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors’ website.  
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The Federal Reserve Board generates the H8 report in weekly and monthly 
formats.  We use the weekly data.  The weekly data are generated in the following 
manner.  The largest banks in the country report weekly to the Federal Reserve and 
during our sample period this number varied between 33 and 35 banks.  The remaining 
banks are divided into eight size-based groups and a sample of banks in each group is 
selected weekly.  The selected banks are surveyed for the data items in the H8 report.  
The sample results are used along with quarterly call report ratios to estimate the total 
values for each H8 report item for each group.  The group totals are accumulated to 
generate the results for all banks, which is the data we use.   
The Federal Reserve does a number of checks and adjustments on the estimates to 
insure their validity.  First, the estimates are compared to actual call report data and the 
estimates are consistently close to the actual data.  Second, mergers between banks and 
thrifts cause breaks in the time series.  The Fed backward adjusts the data for the effects 
of mergers to smooth out any breaks.  Third, the Fed reviews the report format every 
three years to ensure the usefulness of the items reported. 
The point of this discussion on the H8 report is to acknowledge that we are 
working with estimates generated from samples of banks, instead of actual data collected 
from all banks.  In addition, we wanted to point out that the Federal Reserve makes every 
effort to ensure that the sample results accurately represent the actual balance sheet 
positions of the banking industry in the U.S. 
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5.  Analysis 
5.1. Daily Rate Standard Deviations and the Direction of Quarter-End Rate Pressures 
 
We begin our analysis by examining the daily standard deviations of the fed funds rate.  
Hamilton (1996) and Cyree and Winters (2001) find that volatility in fed funds rates 
increases at the quarter-end in GARCH models, so we want to determine if the high 
quarter-end volatility is present in our data and if so provide a feel for the regularity of 
high quarter-end volatility. We begin by ranking trading days within each year by the 
standard deviation of the fed funds rate (highest rank represents highest standard 
deviation). The last trading day in a quarter tends to rank very high within a year with all 
but one quarter-end falling into the top volatility quartiles of their respective years, and 
28 of 36 falling into the top volatility deciles. 
To provide additional insight into just how volatile fed funds rates are at quarter-
ends, we plot the standard deviation in Figure 1.  We adjusted the daily data by deleting 
some low volatility observations in the middle of a quarter in order to align quarter-ends 
over the entire sample period. After the adjustment, the last trading days of each quarter 
always fall on days 61, 125, 188, and 250 in the year, respectively.  Once we have 
aligned the quarter-ends, we average the daily standard deviations for each trading day 
over the nine years.2  Thus, Figure 1 plots the average daily volatility in the fed funds rate 
relative to quarter-ends across our sample period. Although some events other than 
quarter-ends such as biweekly settlements with the Fed (see Griffiths and Winters (1995)) 
clearly influence the behavior of the series, regular volatility spikes around the last day of 
the quarter are quite apparent.  
 
2 Utilizing standard deviations normalized within each year yields similar results. 
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We have verified that fed funds rates are highly volatile at the quarter-end, which 
tells us that something is happening at that time.  However, this does not provide any 
insight into whether the volatility comes from bank initiated window dressing or bank 
customer initiated behavior.  To begin to address that issue, we examine the direction of 
the change in the effective fed funds rate on the last trading day of the quarter.  If banks 
are purchasing fed funds at quarter-ends to window dress, then the fed funds rate should 
increase at the quarter-ends.  In addition, if the rate increase is from window dressing, 
then this increase should be temporary (we discuss the daily behavior of fed funds rates 
and supply and demand of reserves in the next section to provide context for our 
conclusions in this section).  
We begin by examining changes in the effective fed funds rate on the last trading 
day of the quarter relative to the previous trading day. There are 27 quarter-ends in our 
sample period that are not year-ends, and on these 27 days the effective rate increases 23 
times and decreases four times.  There are nine year-ends in our sample and the effective 
fed funds rate decreased on eight of the nine year-ends.  This suggests that about 85% of 
the time rates go up on the last trading day of the first three calendar quarters and about 
89% of the time rates go down on the last trading day of the year.  Clearly, something is 
going on at the end of the quarter.  However, it appears that it could be something 
different from the first three quarter-ends of the calendar year to the year-end.   
To further examine the timing of fed funds rate changes, we estimate the 
following equation as an AR model estimated using the unconditional least squares 













   (2) 
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where 
 ΔFFt =  first difference in the daily effective fed funds rate (FFt – FFt-1), 
bqtr = 0/1 dummy variable that equals 1 on the day before the last trading 
day of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd calendar quarters and 0 otherwise, 
qtr = 0/1 dummy variable that equals 1 on the last trading day of the 1st, 
2nd, and 3rd calendar quarters and 0 otherwise, 
aqtr = 0/1 dummy variable that equals 1 on the first trading day following 
the end of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd calendar quarters and 0 otherwise, 
aqtr2 = 0/1 dummy variable that equals 1 on the second trading day 
following the end of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd calendar quarters and 0 
otherwise, 
byend = 0/1 dummy variable that equals 1 on the day before the last trading 
day of the year and 0 otherwise, 
yend = 0/1 dummy variable that equals 1 on the last trading day of the 
year and 0 otherwise, 
ayend = 0/1 dummy variable that equals 1 on the first trading day the new 
year and 0 otherwise, and 
ayend2 = 0/1 dummy variable that equals 1 on the second trading day of the 
new year and 0 otherwise. 
 
The results from estimating the AR model (equations (2)) are reported in Table 1.  When 
equation (2) is estimated using OLS, the Durbin-Watson statistic is 2.523 which suggests 
the presence of negative autocorrelation in the error term at better than the 1% level of 
significance.  To address the negative autocorrelation, we switch from OLS to the AR 
model using the unconditional least squares (ULS) method.  AR(1) and AR(2) models do 
not eliminate the significant negative autocorrelation, but an AR(3) model does, so the 
results reported in Table 1 are from an AR(3) model.3   
 The results from the equation (2) suggest that at quarter-ends the effective fed 
funds rate: increases significantly on the last day of the quarter (34 bp) and declines 
significantly across the first two days of the quarter (8 bp and 29 bp). This pattern is 
consistent with an increase in purchasing of fed funds on the last day of a quarter 
 
3 Another method for estimating equation (2) is a GARCH model with autoregressive errors.  We estimated 
the GARCH model as a robustness check and the results from the GARCH model are consistent with the 
results reported in Table 1.  These results are not report for brevity but are available upon request. 
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followed by two days of declining rates to return to normal level.  The purchase of fed 
funds on the last day of the quarter can be consistent with window dressing, but taking 
two days to return to normal is not consistent with window dressing.   That is, window 
dressing is the dressing up of the balance sheet for quarter-end and year-end reporting 
purposes, so once the quarter-end reporting date is past, there is no further need to 
continue dressing up the balance sheet and the fed funds rate should return to normal.  
Taking two days to return to normal in an overnight loan market suggests that the rate 
pressure continued one day longer than is necessary for window dressing.4 
 On the last day of the year the daily rate change is negative and significant.  The 
decline in the effective fed funds rate on this day averages about 45 basis points.  The 
first day of the new-year is positive and significant with the increase averaging about 76 
basis points.  There is clearly something is going on that the year-end.  However, the 
pattern is opposite of the pattern at the quarter-ends, and the decline in rates on the last 
day of the year cannot support fed funds purchases by banks to window dress.5 
Griffiths and Winters (1997 and 2004) show that one-month interest rates decline on the 
last trading day of the year in repos, commercial paper, CDs, bankers’ acceptances, euro-
dollar deposits, and U.S. dollar-based LIBOR.  Further, they show that the decline begins 
before the last trading day of the year and spans the year-end, which leads them to 
conclude that the year-end rate decline across these one-month money market securities 
 
4 Some may be concerned that taking two days for rates to decline is related to the settlement process in the 
securities markets.  However, banks acquiring securities to window dress would most likely acquire money 
market securities because these are the typical securities in banks’ investment portfolios.  All money 
market securities trade in immediately available funds and thus have same day settlement.  Accordingly, 
taking two days for fed funds rates to decline is not related to the settlement process in money market 
securities. 
5 Recall that fed funds rates decline on the last day of the year eight out of nine times during our sample 
period, which suggests that our results are not driven by outliers.  However, we did check for outliers and 
none of our year-end observations were an outlier.  
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is caused by a preferred habitat for liquidity by money market investors.  Thus, the year-
end rate decrease in the effective Fed funds rate may not be from bank driven activity, 
but instead may results from general liquidity pressures at the year-end.  Additionally, 
this year-end decline in the fed funds rate could be the result of large reserve supply 
increases by the Federal Reserve at the year-end (Demiralp, Preslopsky, and Whitesell 
(2004) note that the Fed has provided a generous supply of reserves at year-end in recent 
years).  We address the source of the quarter-end and year-end pressures in section 5.3 by 
examining bank aggregate balance sheet activity around quarter-ends and year-ends.  
However, before moving on to bank balance sheet activity we discuss daily fed funds rate 
changes and the supply and demand of reserves. 
 
5.2. Daily Fed Funds Rate Changes and the Supply and Demand of Reserves 
In the previous section we discussed changes in fed funds rates based on bank trading 
behavior in the fed funds market.  In this section we provide context for our discussion. 
 The ability of Federal Reserve to change reserve balances and therefore change 
the fed funds rates is known as the liquidity effect and is often taken for granted.  
However, the liquidity effect has been difficult to verify empirically and the lack of 
empirical support has become known as the “liquidity puzzle”.  Historically, the 
empirical work on the liquidity effect has used low frequency data.  Recent work on the 
liquidity effect has moved to using daily data. 
 Hamilton (1997) examines the effect of reserve supply shocks on daily fed funds 
rates.  Hamilton finds a significant liquidity effect only on settlement Wednesdays.  
Thornton (2001) raises questions about the robustness of Hamilton’s results and in 
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alternative tests finds no evidence of a liquidity effect.  Carpenter and Demiralp (2004) 
extend the line of research using a new measure for reserve supply shocks and find strong 
evidence of a daily liquidity effect.  Clearly, the liquidity puzzle is an ongoing debate, but 
recent evidence provides some support for a liquidity effect in daily fed funds rate 
changes. 
   With some support of a liquidity effect in daily fed funds rates, it appears that 
the Federal Reserve can manage interest rates if they so chose.  Then the next question 
becomes whether the Federal Reserve is attempting to manage interest rates.  Thornton 
(2004) provides a detailed discussion of the Federal Reserve’s operating procedures since 
1982.  Thornton states that there is agreement among researchers that by the early 1990s 
the Fed had switched its operating procedures from borrowed reserves to targeting the 
funds rate directly.  This suggests that our primary sample period (January 3, 1994 
through December 31, 2002) falls under a period when the Fed is targeting the funds rate 
and is therefore attempting to manage the fed funds rate.  Using the verbatim transcripts 
of FOMC meetings, Thornton suggests that the Fed has been targeting the funds rate 
since it abandoned managing monetary aggregates in October of 1982.  This suggests that 
the Allen and Saunders sample period (1978 – 1986), which we use later in this paper, 
crosses different Fed operating procedures. 
 Now, the remaining issue is the daily behavior of the fed funds rate in the 
presence of liquidity effects and under operating procedures where the Fed targets the 
funds rate.  Griffiths and Winters (1995) use the regulations for bank settlement with the 
Federal Reserve to model daily rate pressures in the fed funds markets.  Their model 
suggests that rates should decline on Fridays, rebound on Mondays, decline on the day 
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before settlement, and increase on settlement Wednesdays.  Clouse and Dow (2002) 
model the demand for reserves and the daily demand for reserves follows the same basic 
pattern as the rate pressures in Griffiths and Winters.  Empirical research suggests that 
the daily fed funds rate changes follow the predicted pattern (see, for example, Griffiths 
and Winters (1995), Hamilton (1996), Cyree and Winters (2001), and Bartolini, Bertola, 
and Prati (2002)).   
 The point of this discussion is that banks’ predictable demand for reserves creates 
a persistent pattern in daily fed funds rates in an environment where the liquidity effect 
likely exists and the Fed is targeting interest rates.  So, how is this possible?  Bartolini, 
Bertola, and Prati (2002) state that  
“the Fed may accommodate liquidity shocks incompletely either because 
institutional features of the market limit its ability to intervene on any 
given day, or because it prefers to allow interest rate changes to absorb 
part of the realized liquidity shocks.” 
 
Further, Bartolini, Bertola, and Prati (2001) state that  
“(T)his realistically captures the Fed’s reluctance to provide liquidity 
elastically at a fixed target rate, and its preference for enforcing a small 
corridor of rates, the width of which reflects its tolerance for day-to-day 
expected interest rate fluctuations.”  
 
Bartolini, Bertola, and Prati (2001) find evidence that the Fed is willing to tolerate a 
spread in rates within a maintenance period of 15 basis points.  They note that their 
spread is within the 20 basis point deviation of the fed funds rate from the target rate 
found by Feinman (1993) for almost certain Fed intervention to manage the fed funds 
rate.  Further, Feinman finds that at a 10 basis point deviation between the fed funds rate 
and the target rate there is a greater than 30% chance that the Fed will abstain from short-
term open market operations.  Griffiths and Winters (1995) find that the average daily 
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spread between the high and low fed funds rate is: between 11 and 15 basis points over 
the first eight trading days of the maintenance period, is 25 basis on the day before 
settlement, and is 59 basis points on settlement Wednesdays.  Further, Feinman (1993) 
notes that the Fed is unlikely to make a strong move against deviations in the fed funds 
rate from the target rate on Fridays and settlement Wednesdays.  Empirical research 
suggests that Fridays and settlement Wednesdays have significant daily rate changes, but 
these changes are temporary. 
This discussion suggests that the Fed has the ability to manage interest rates, but 
that it does not trade against all deviations from the target rate and, in particular, often 
does not trade against temporary deviations.  Accordingly, we feel it is reasonable to 
discuss daily changes in fed funds rates around quarter-ends and year-ends in terms of 
bank demands affecting the fed funds rates.  In particular, we think this is reasonable 
because we test for temporary changes related to window dressing.  We do acknowledge 
that a possible alternative explanation for the daily rate changes is Federal Reserve 
changes in reserve supplies and make this point where appropriate throughout the paper.   
        
5.3. Aggregate Bank Balance Sheet Activity 
Allen and Saunders (1992) find that: (1) bank total assets increase at quarter-ends, (2) fed 
funds purchases increase at quarter-ends, and (3) fed funds purchases are highly 
correlated with the increase in total assets.  From this they conclude that banks are 
upward window dressing.  Next, we analyze weekly changes in various aggregate bank 
assets and liabilities to determine if quarter-end effects are present using our methods and 
if they are present whether these effects are consistent with bank window dressing.  Since 
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we find different effects between the first three quarter-ends and the year-end in fed 
funds, we analyze year-ends separately from the other three calendar quarter-ends.  
The data are collected on a weekly basis and reported as of Wednesday. 6  It is 
seldom the case that the last business day of the quarter falls on Wednesday, but our 
model allows us to capture activity around quarter-ends. We run the following AR(1) 
model estimated using the unconditional least squares (ULS) method.  The equation for 
changes in balance sheet items is:7   
tti AyByAqBqCh  +++++= 4321,      (3) 
where: 
Chi,t =  Percentage change in asset/liability i in week t, 
   
Bq = 1 on the last Wednesday of each of the first three quarters and 0 
otherwise,  
Aq = 1 on the first Wednesday following the end of each of the first 
three quarters and 0 otherwise,  
By =  1 on the last Wednesday of each year and 0 otherwise, 
Ay =  1 on the first Wednesday of each year and 0 otherwise, 
εt   is the error term, which is assumed to be normally distributed.  
 
Estimates of equation (3) allow us to determine which bank assets and liabilities 
exhibit significant changes around quarter-ends and year-ends. We separate quarter-ends 
and year-ends to see if the activity around the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd quarter-ends is different 
from year-ends in terms of magnitude and/or direction of changes.  The results are 
reported in Table 2.   
 
6 The data period consists of 469 weeks. The three weeks following the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks had the largest changes in transaction deposits levels (a 50% increase in the first week followed by 
the return to the pre-September 11 level in the following two weeks) but were retained for the analysis. 
Exclusion of these three weeks does not affect the results for any of the series. 
7 The balance sheet items exhibit significant negative autocorrelation when examined with OLS.  For each 
balance sheet item the significant negative autocorrelation is removed with an AR(1) model, so all the 
results in Table 2 are from an AR(1) model estimated using the unconditional least squares (ULS) method.  
For robustness, we also estimate equation (3) as an AR(1) model using a GARCH method.  The results are 
generally consistent between the two methods.  When differences occur, the differences come from the 
GARCH method not fitting the data well.  
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Allen and Saunders (1992) use Call report data.  We use H8 report data.  The data 
items available from the two data sets are different with the Call reports providing more 
detail.  Accordingly, we analyze some different balance sheet items from Allen and 
Saunders.  
Panel A of Table 2 reports results on changes in total assets and total liabilities.  
The parameter estimates for the quarter-ends are not significant for both total assets and 
total liabilities, while the parameter estimates for the beginning of each quarter shows 
significant (at better than the 1% level) increases for both total assets and total liabilities.  
Given that our data points are on Wednesdays and therefore not exactly on the last 
trading day of the quarter, we cannot rule out that these increases are occurring before the 
quarter-end (which could be supportive of window dressing).  However, window dressing 
is by definition a temporary position, so finding increases through the first Wednesday of 
a quarter does not support window dressing (especially if these increases are funded with 
fed funds, since the typical maturity of fed funds transactions is one day).  In further 
analysis (that is not reported here in table form, but is available upon request) we find 
that 50% of the increase in total assets and total liabilities is still present in the second 
week of the quarter.  While total assets and total liabilities are moving back toward 
normal levels during the second week of the quarter, a two-week deviation is longer than 
one would expect for window dressing given the high level of liquidity in bank short-
term assets and short-term liabilities where window dressing is likely to occur. 
At the turn-of-the-year, the end-of-the-year parameter estimates show significant 
increases in total assets and total liabilities while the beginning-of-the-year parameter 
estimates are not different from zero.  These results suggest that total assets and total 
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liabilities increase in advance of the year-end and remain high through the first 
Wednesday of the new-year.  Additional analysis suggests that both total assets and total 
liabilities return to normal levels across the second week of the new-year.  
The results for quarter-end and year-end changes in total assets and total liabilities 
do not provide strong support for bank window dressing.  The pattern for changes in total 
assets and total liabilities does not match the pattern for window dressing either around 
quarter-ends or around year-ends, as the increase in total assets and/or total liabilities 
remains longer than expected for a “temporary” change. 
While the evidence from total assets and total liabilities does not provide support 
for window dressing, we continue the search for window dressing by examining the 
short-term asset accounts.  If a bank is upward window dressing, as suggested by Allen 
and Saunders, then the bank would window dress in the most liquid assets because the 
window dressing could quickly be reversed after the reporting date passes.  Accordingly, 
we examine quarter-end and year-end changes in the most liquid bank assets: cash and 
government securities.  The results for estimating equation (3) on changes in cash and 
government securities are reported in Panel B of Table 2. 
If banks are upward window dressing, as suggested by Allen and Saunders 
(1992), then cash and/or government securities should increase before quarter-ends and 
decline following quarter-ends with the increase and decrease being of similar magnitude. 
We find no significant change in either cash or government securities before quarter-ends 
while both increased significantly (at better than the 5% level) at the beginning of 
quarters.  Again, with the timing of our data we cannot rule out window dressing from an 
increase immediately before the quarter-end. However, the fact that this increase is 
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sustained throughout the first Wednesday of the quarter is inconsistent with window 
dressing. Moreover, further analysis suggests that cash and government securities return 
to normal levels over the second week of the quarter, which, given the liquidity of these 
assets, is not consistent with a temporary effect from window dressing.  This is especially 
true if a bank is window dressing using purchased funds because purchased funds carry 
explicit costs while cash is a non-earning asset.  At the turn of the year, we find that cash 
increases significantly at the end-of-the-year while government securities do not change.  
We also find no change in cash or government securities at the beginning of the year.  
These results suggest that cash increases at the end-of-the-year and remains high through 
the first Wednesday of the new-year.  This timing does not match with the temporary 
nature of window dressing.    
Panel C of Table 2 reports changes in transaction and non-transaction deposits.  If 
bank customers have quarter-end and year-end preferred habitats for liquidity based on 
cash obligations, then we expect that they move funds into transaction accounts before 
the quarter-end so they can pay their obligations and out of transaction accounts after the 
quarter-ends.  In addition, these customers will reduce non-transaction deposits before 
quarter-ends as they move their funds into transaction accounts, and increase non-
transaction deposits after the quarter-ends as they return to storing their funds in interest-
earning accounts.  We find a significant increase in transaction deposits and a significant 
decrease in non-transaction deposits at the end of the quarter, which is consistent with 
bank customers preparing for quarter-end cash obligations.  At the beginning of the 
quarter non-transaction deposits increase significantly suggesting a return to storing 
liquidity in earning accounts after meeting quarter-end obligations.  At the turn-of-the-
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year we find a significant increase in transaction deposits and a significant decrease in 
non-transaction deposits (at better than the 5% level) at the end of the year followed by a 
reversal of the pattern at the beginning of the year.  The combination of results at the 
year-end is consistent with customers managing their deposit accounts to make payments 
for year-end cash obligations. Also, the turn-of-the-year increase in bank cash holdings 
discussed earlier parallels the changes in deposits: when customers  move funds into 
transaction accounts, banks are likely to hold more cash to serve customers’ needs and to 
meet the increased reserve requirements related to this customer behavior (transaction 
deposits have a higher reserve requirement than non-transaction deposits). These patterns 
are not suggestive of bank window dressing.  
Panel D of Table 2 reports changes in bank borrowing. If customers are moving 
cash, then banks must adjust their balance sheets to accommodate this movement.    
Given the temporary nature of these calendar-based changes, banks are likely to adjust 
their cash and short-term investments, their borrowings, or both. We find that bank total 
borrowing did not change significantly at quarter-ends. However, total borrowing and 
borrowing from other than U.S. banks declined significantly (at better than the 1% level) 
at the beginning of the quarter.  Around the year-end, the end-of-the-year parameter 
estimates are not different from zero while total borrowing and borrowing from others 
declined at the beginning of the year.  Additional analysis shows that a large and 
significant increase in total borrowing and borrowing from others occurs two weeks 
before the end of the quarter or year. Now the beginning-of-quarter (year) decrease 
appears to be just a reversal of that earlier increase.  Overall, this analysis suggests that 
banks prepare for quarter-ends and year-ends in advance by borrowing more funds to 
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accommodate the needs of their customers. By the second Wednesday of the new quarter 
or year bank assets and liabilities return to normal levels. Again, this is consistent with 
banks managing their balance sheets in response to customer activities, not window 
dressing. 
In summary, our analysis of bank balance sheet activity strongly suggests that 
quarter-end and year-end effects in bank assets are not driven by window dressing.  The 
results are generally consistent with our expectations of how bank balance sheets would 
adjust in response to bank customers’ movement of cash for quarter-end and year-end 
cash obligations. 
 
5.4.  Allen and Saunders Sample Period 
To this point in the paper we have re-examined the issue of bank window dressing using 
different methods than Allen and Saunders and found no evidence of bank window 
dressing.  Instead, the weight of the evidence suggests that bank quarter-end and year-end 
balance sheet activity is in response to customer quarter-end and year-end liquidity 
management.  However, our choice to start the analysis with the fed funds standard 
deviation data from the Federal Reserve caused our analysis to cover a different time 
period than the analysis by Allen and Saunders.  Accordingly, at this point we are unable 
to determine whether our methods provide a clearer picture of bank quarter-end and year-
end activity or that banks have changed their quarter-end and year-end behavior.  To 
address this issue, we collect data from the Allen and Saunders sample period and re-
estimate our AR models (equations (2) and (3)).  The results from the AR model 
(equation (2)) estimated on effective fed funds rates are reported in Table 3 and the 
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results from the AR model (equation (3)) estimated on the H8 report balance sheet data 
are in Table 4. 
 Before discussing the parameter estimates reported in Table 3 we note that the AR 
model reported in Table 3 is an AR(1) model.  That is, one lag in the error is sufficient to 
address the negative autocorrelation in the data.  The sample of fed funds rates used 
earlier required an AR(3) model to handle the negative autocorrelation.  This is our first 
piece of evidence that fed funds rates behave differently across the two sample periods. 
 The results on the daily changes in the effective fed funds rate during the Allen 
and Saunders sample period around quarter-ends suggest that rates increase significantly 
across the last two days of the quarter and decrease significantly across the first two days 
of the quarter.8  This pattern is consistent with banks purchasing fed funds at the end of 
the quarter.  However, two days of rate increases followed by two days of rate declines is 
not consistent with using fed funds to window dress because the typical maturity of a fed 
funds transaction is one day.  In addition, rates increase about 82 basis points at the end 
of the quarter while declining only about 36 basis points at the beginning of the quarter, 
which suggests that the quarter-end rate pressure has not fully abated after two days. 
 At the year-end we find that rates increase significantly on the last two days of the 
year followed by rates declining significantly across the first two days of the new-year.  
This pattern is consistent with the pattern around the quarter-ends and is consistent with 
purchasing funds at the year-end.  However, again, the timing of the pattern is not 
consistent with window dressing because the rate increase begins too early and it persists 
for too long.  Additionally, we note that the year-end pattern during the Allen and 
 
8 The effective fed funds rate on the last two days of 1985 and 1986 are extreme outliers, so in our 
estimation of equation (2) during the Allen and Saunders (1992) sample period the quarter-end and year-
end dummy variables for these days are set to 0. 
 22 
Saunders sample period is in the opposite direction to the pattern reported in Table 1.  
This difference could be the result of changes in bank behavior.  However, this difference 
is likely the results of Fed year-end behavior during our primary sample period as 
Demiralp, Preslopsky and Whitesell (2004) note that the Fed has provided a generous 
supply of reserve at year-end in recent years. 
 The results from the changes in bank total assets and total liabilities during the 
Allen and Saunders sample period are reported in Panel A of Table 4.  The change in 
total assets and the change in total liabilities are not significant at quarter-ends but do 
increase significantly at the beginning of the quarter. In addition, we find that both total 
assets and total liabilities increase significantly before the year-end, but do not change 
significantly after the year-end. These results are consistent with our previous results 
(Panel A, Table 2).  These results are not suggestive of bank window dressing. 
 Panel B of Table 4 reports the changes in cash and government securities from the 
Allen and Saunders sample period.  We find no change in cash at the end of the quarter 
followed by a significant increase at the beginning of the quarter.  As to the turn of the 
year, we find that cash increased significantly at the year-end, while it did not change at 
the beginning of the year. The pattern in cash is similar to the pattern reported for cash in 
Table 2. It is not consistent with window dressing.  In addition, we find that government 
securities decline significantly at the end of the quarter and increase significantly at the 
beginning of the quarter.  This pattern does not support window dressing, either.  
 Panel C of Table 4 reports activity in transaction and non-transaction deposits 
during the Allen and Saunders sample period.  Transaction deposits (demand deposits) 
are unchanged at the end of the quarter while increasing significantly at the beginning of 
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the quarter, the end-of-the-year, and the beginning of the year.  These results suggest that 
bank customers move cash into transaction accounts around the quarter-end and the year-
end.  This pattern cannot be bank window dressing because it is customer initiated 
activity.  We note that the pattern in transaction deposits reported in Table 4 is different 
from the patterns reported in Table 2 suggesting differences between the two sample 
periods.  Non-transaction deposits increase significantly (at better than 10% level) at the 
beginning of the quarter and decrease significantly (at better than the 1% level) at the 
beginning of the year.  This pattern is different from the pattern reported to Table 2 which 
again suggests changes in customer behavior between the two sample periods. 
 Panel D of Table 4 reports results on bank borrowing during the Allen and 
Saunders sample period.  We find no evidence of significant changes (at the 10% level or 
better) in any borrowing category around either the quarter-end or the year-end.  
However, when we extend the analysis to cover the time span from the second to last 
Wednesday of a quarter/year through the second Wednesday of the new quarter/year, it 
becomes clear that bank borrowing increases two weeks before the end of the year (it is 
still insignificant around quarter-ends). The increase is sustained through the first week of 
the new-year, and is reversed in the second week. Moreover, the increase in bank 
borrowing is driven by borrowing from U.S. banks. This is different from our primary 
sample results and is suggestive of U.S. banks being able to develop relations with other 
U.S. and foreign institutions and/or to access other funding sources in recent years.  
Again, the length of time covered by the changes is longer than is necessary for the 
temporary nature of window dressing.  
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 In summary, we draw two conclusions from re-visiting data from the Allen and 
Saunders sample period.  First, the rate pressures in the fed funds market and the bank 
balance sheet changes vary between the two sample periods suggesting the bank quarter-
end and year-end behavior has changed from the Allen and Saunders sample period to 
our more recent sample period.  Second, using different methods that focus on the timing 
of changes we find little evidence to support bank upward window dressing during the 
Allen and Saunders sample period. The differences between the two sample periods are 
mostly in the timing of turn-of-the-quarter and turn-of-the-year changes in bank assets 
and liabilities. Our main conclusion remains unchanged in that the weight of the evidence 
from our results during the Allen and Saunders sample period suggests that banks 
respond to turn-of-the-quarter and turn-of-the-year customer cash management activity. 
 
5.5. Differences in Bank Balance Sheets Between the Two Sample Periods  
 
From the analysis in sections 5.3 and 5.4, it appears that behavior of banks and bank 
customers at quarter-ends and the year-end changed from the Allen and Saunders sample 
period to the sample period covered in our primary analysis. In this section we briefly 
examine some differences between the two sample periods that provide insights into the 
differences in behavior between the two sample periods.  
 We begin by examining the line items on aggregate bank balance sheets used in 
our above analysis across the sample periods.  We present these items as a percent of 
total assets in Table 5.9  We provide balance sheet data from the beginning and end of 
 
9 We also examine some balance sheet items as a percent of total liabilities.  The interpretation of the 
results does not change when using the percent of total assets versus the percent of total liabilities.  
Accordingly, we chose to report all numbers in Table 5 as a percent of total assets for consistency. 
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each sample period.10  However, because each sample period begins in January and ends 
in December, we chose not to use the first and last available observation to avoid the 
year-end effects discussed previously. Instead, we use the last observation for October 
from the first and last year of each sample period.  While this choice is arbitrary, it 
provides a snapshot of the changes through time that provides insights into the 
differences across the sample periods. 11 
 Our primary analysis suggests that bank balance sheet changes at quarter-ends 
and year-ends occur because of customer-related activities, so we begin our discussion of 
the balance sheet items reported in Table 5 with transaction deposits.  Transaction 
deposits declined, as a percent of total assets, by 8.40% (29.96% - 21.56%) during the 
Allen and Saunders sample period and further declined by another 10.83% (20.41% - 
9.58%) during our primary sample period.  This suggests that bank customers have 
dramatically reduced their funding of the banks’ asset base with transaction deposits.  
However, how banks must respond to this change depends on where the deposits went.  
A look at non-transaction deposits suggests that, during the Allen and Saunders sample 
period, a very small portion of the transaction deposits appears to have moved into time 
deposits (which increased by 0.64%, from 50.44% to 51.08%), but the majority of the 
decline in transaction deposits as a percent of assets appears to be from deposits leaving 
the bank.  Deposits apparently continued to leave banks between the end of the Allen and 
Saunders period and the beginning of our primary sample period. However, during this 
period the bulk of the decline came from non-transaction deposits, which fell by 5.90%, 
 
10 We chose to limit the data in Table 5 for brevity.  We also examine balance sheet data annually across 
each sample and the results are similar to those reported in Table 5 (changes are more gradual, of course, 
but there are no trend reversals during either sample period). 
11 Using data from the first and last week of each sample does not change our conclusions.  Using data from 
a different week within a year does not change our interpretations. 
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from 51.08% to 45.18%, while transaction deposits declined by only 1.15% from 21.56% 
to 20.41%. During our primary sample period, however, the 10.83% decline in 
transaction deposits mentioned above was offset by a 10.39% increase (from 45.18% to 
55.57%) in non-transaction deposits suggesting that banks stopped further erosion of their 
deposit base. 
Less transaction deposits means that banks can hold less cash to cover potential 
demand withdrawals, but also that banks will need to find other funding sources for their 
asset base. We observe that bank cash holdings, as a percent of total assets, fell by 2.97% 
(11.06% - 8.09%) across the Allen and Saunders sample period, while government 
securities remained relatively unchanged.  This is consistent with the reduced need to 
hold cash.  However, between 10/78 and 10/86 bank aggregate total assets increased by 
$1,334 billion, or 110%.  This means that banks, even after the reduction in cash, will 
need additional funding to support their asset base, and we see that total borrowing 
increased by 4.12% (15.03% – 10.91%).  Between the two sample periods cash holdings, 
as a percent of total assets, fell by 2.86% (8.09% - 5.23%). This decline in cash coincides 
with a 7.22% (19.13% - 11.91%) increase in government securities as a percent of total 
assets, which suggests that banks moved toward storing liquidity in the money markets.  
Finally, during the primary sample period cash continued to decline, but only by 0.46% 
(5.23% - 4.77%).  This very small decline in cash is accompanied by a 4.63% (19.13% - 
14.50%) decline in government securities.  Since total assets increased by $3,055 billion, 
or 80%, from 10/94 to 10/02, the decline in government securities is likely the result of 
moving toward less liquid assets.  This decline in government securities is accompanied 
by a 3.98% (19.76% - 15.78%) increase in total borrowing.   
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Total borrowing increased steadily across both sample periods. During the Allen and 
Saunders sample period, both borrowing from U.S. banks and other sources increased. 
During our primary sample period, however, the increase in total borrowing was driven 
by borrowing from sources other than U.S. banks. Borrowing from U.S. banks even 
declined, as a percent of total assets, between the two sample periods and, to a lesser 
extent, during the later sample period.  The increase in borrowing from sources other than 
U.S. banks could also explain the change in the year-end behavior of the fed funds rate 
across the two samples.  That is, the availability of other funding sources may reduce the 
demand for fed funds at the year-end.  Unfortunately, the balance sheet data we use do 
not contain sufficient detail for us to explore this supposition.     
 The decline in transaction deposits as a percent of total assets along with the way 
that banks responded to this decline suggests the development of alternatives to 
transaction deposits for bank customers and the development of alternatives for banks to 
fund their asset base.  Specifically, the changes in bank balance sheets across the two 
sample periods suggest bank and bank-customer changes that parallel the expansion of 
the money markets.  The expansion of the money markets can be shown in many 
different ways.  We chose to plot the dollar value of investment in money market mutual 
funds to demonstrate our point.12  Figure 2 plots the dollar value of investment in 
 
12 We examined other alternatives to demonstrate the expansion of the money markets and all of them 
provided the same basic insights as provided by the plot of the money market mutual fund data. 
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institutional money funds and retail money funds from January 1978 through December 
2002 on a monthly basis.13 
 Figure 2 shows that the beginning of the Allen and Saunders sample period 
coincides with the start-up phase of the money market mutual fund industry.  At the 
beginning of the Allen and Saunders sample period banks held $360 billion in transaction 
deposits.  During the Allen and Saunders sample period the money market mutual fund 
industry shows slow but steady growth.  By the end of this sample period there is about 
$300 billion invested in money market mutual funds (institutional funds plus retail funds 
in Figure 2) while transaction deposits increased by $190 billion to about $550 billion.  
By the beginning of the primary sample investment in money market mutual funds had 
grown by $280 billion to approximately $580 billion with transaction deposits increasing 
by $230 billion to about $780 billion.  Finally, by the end of the primary sample period 
the investment in money market mutual funds had grown by $1,616 billion to $2,196 
billion while transaction deposits had declined by $120 billion to approximately $660 
billion.   
 The point of the analysis in this section is that bank-customer behavior changed 
across the two samples and banks responded to this change.  It is clear from the changes 
in the bank balance sheets that customers moved their money out of transaction deposits, 
either out of banks as the money markets developed to provide a viable alternative for the 
bank customers, or into time deposits.  The development of the money markets also 
provides an alternative funding source for bank to offset the decline in funding by 
transaction deposits.       
 
13 The data in figure 2 on institutional and retail money funds are from Table 7 of the H6 (Money Stock 
Measures) report by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and are available on the 
Board’s web site.  Institutional money market funds are funds that require large dollar initial investments.  
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6. Conclusion 
We verify that quarter-ends and year-ends are highly volatile in the fed funds market and 
attempt to determine if the volatility in fed funds rates is associated with bank window 
dressing or is a response to bank customer preferred habitat.  Changes in banks’ balance 
sheet items around quarter-ends and year-ends are consistent with banks responding to 
the maneuvers of their customers who prepare to meet their quarter-end and year-end 
obligations. While the reported evidence does not completely refute window dressing, it 
suggests that the quarter-end and year-end effects in banks are not due to window 
dressing.  Instead, the evidence is consistent with banks and markets responding to 
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Table 1. The daily change in the effective fed funds rate around quarter-ends and 
the year-end 
This table presents the results from estimating the AR model estimated using the 













    
where ΔFFt = first difference in the daily effective fed funds rate (FFt – FFt-1), bqtr = 0/1 
dummy variable that equals 1 on the day before the last trading day of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd 
calendar quarters and 0 otherwise, qtr = 0/1 dummy variable that equals 1 on the last 
trading day of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd calendar quarters and 0 otherwise, aqtr = 0/1 dummy 
variable that equals 1 on the first trading day following the end of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd 
calendar quarters and 0 otherwise, aqtr2 = 0/1 dummy variable that equals 1 on the 
second trading day following the end of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd calendar quarters and 0 
otherwise, byend = 0/1 dummy variable that equals 1 on the day before the last trading 
day of the year and 0 otherwise, yend =0/1 dummy variable that equals 1 on the last 
trading day of the year and 0 otherwise, ayend =0/1 dummy variable that equals 1 on the 
first trading day the new year and 0 otherwise, and ayend2 = 0/1 dummy variable that 
equals 1 on the second trading day of the new year and 0 otherwise. 
Variable Parameter Estimate p-value 
Intercept -0.0011 0.5625 
bqtr 0.0063 0.8504 
qtr 0.3363*** <0.0001 
aqtr -0.0819** 0.0159 
aqtr2 -0.2854*** <0.0001 
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byend 0.1542*** 0.0074 
yend -0.4457*** <0.0001 
ayend 0.7557*** <0.0001 
ayend2 -0.1932*** 0.0008 
 
Significance levels are shown as *, **, and ***, representing 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.
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Table 2. Turn-of-the-quarter behavior of bank assets and liabilities  
for the period January 5, 1994 through December 25, 2002 (reported weekly) 
 
This table presents the results from running the following AR(1) model estimated using 
the unconditional least squares (ULS) method.  The equation for changes in balance sheet 
items is:  tti AyByAqBqCh  +++++= 4321,   
where Chi,t = percentage change in asset/liability i in week t, Bq = 1 on the last 
Wednesday of each of the first three quarters and 0 otherwise, Aq = 1 on the first 
Wednesday each of the first three quarters and 0 otherwise, By =1 on the last Wednesday 
of each year and 0 otherwise, Ay =1 on the first Wednesday of each year and 0 otherwise, 
εt is the error term, which is assumed to be normally distributed.  The coefficients have 













































      


























      

























      





































Significance levels are shown as *, **, and ***, representing 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
a – the turn-of-the-year coefficient is different from the corresponding turn-of-the-quarter 
coefficient at the 10% level 
b – the turn-of-the-year coefficient is different from the corresponding turn-of-the-quarter 
coefficient at the 5% level 
c – the turn-of-the-year coefficient is different from the corresponding turn-of-the-quarter 




Table 3.  The daily change in the effective fed funds rate around quarter-ends and 
the year-end for the Allen and Saunders (1992) sample period of 1978 through 1986. 
 
This table presents the results from estimating the AR model estimated using the 













    
where ΔFFt = first difference in the daily effective fed funds rate (FFt – FFt-1), bqtr = 0/1 
dummy variable that equals 1 on the day before the last trading day of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd 
calendar quarters and 0 otherwise, qtr = 0/1 dummy variable that equals 1 on the last 
trading day of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd calendar quarters and 0 otherwise, aqtr = 0/1 dummy 
variable that equals 1 on the first trading day following the end of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd 
calendar quarters and 0 otherwise, aqtr2 = 0/1 dummy variable that equals 1 on the 
second trading day following the end of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd calendar quarters and 0 
otherwise, byend = 0/1 dummy variable that equals 1 on the day before the last trading 
day of the year and 0 otherwise, yend =0/1 dummy variable that equals 1 on the last 
trading day of the year and 0 otherwise, ayend =0/1 dummy variable that equals 1 on the 
first trading day the new year and 0 otherwise, and ayend2 = 0/1 dummy variable that 
equals 1 on the second trading day of the new year and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
Variable Parameter Estimate p-value 
Intercept -0.0013 0.8638 
bqtr 0.2850*** 0.0018 
qtr 0.5391*** <0.0001 
aqtr -0.2001** 0.0258 
 37 
aqtr2 -0.1636* 0.0729 
byend 0.7477*** <0.0001 
yend 0.3845** 0.0311 
ayend -0.3153* 0.0593 
ayend2 -0.6051*** 0.0003 
 
Significance levels are shown as *, **, and ***, representing 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
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Table 4. Turn-of-the-quarter behavior of bank assets and liabilities  
for the Allen and Saunders (1992) sample period from January 4, 1978 through 
December 31, 1986 (reported weekly) 
This table presents the results from running the following AR(1) model estimated using 
the unconditional least squares (ULS) method.  The equation for changes in balance sheet 
items is:  tti AyByAqBqCh  +++++= 4321,   
where Chi,t = percentage change in asset/liability i in week t, Bq = 1 on the last 
Wednesday of each of the first three quarters and 0 otherwise, Aq = 1 on the first 
Wednesday each of the first three quarters and 0 otherwise, By =1 on the last Wednesday 
of each year and 0 otherwise, Ay =1 on the first Wednesday of each year and 0 otherwise, 
εt is the error term, which is assumed to be normally distributed. The coefficients have 













































      


























      

























      





































Significance levels are shown as *, **, and ***, representing 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
a – the turn-of-the-year coefficient is different from the corresponding turn-of-the-quarter 
coefficient at the 10% level 
b – the turn-of-the-year coefficient is different from the corresponding turn-of-the-quarter 
coefficient at the 5% level 
c – the turn-of-the-year coefficient is different from the corresponding turn-of-the-quarter 
coefficient at the 1% level 
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Table 5.  Aggregate Bank Balance Sheet Data 
 
This table provides a snapshot of aggregate bank balance sheet data from the first and last 
year of the Allen and Saunders sample period and the sample period for our primary 
analysis for the balance accounts used in our analysis.  All items are reported as 
















Allen and Saunders Sample 
10/78 95.77 11.06 11.52 29.96 50.44 10.91 5.60 5.31 
10/86 92.40 8.09 11.91 21.56 51.08 15.03 7.83 7.20 
Primary Sample 
10/94 91.94 5.23 19.13 20.41 45.18 15.78 6.59 9.20 
10/02 92.96 4.77 14.50 9.58 55.57 19.76 6.04 13.72 
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Figure 1. Average Daily Volatility of the Fed Funds Rate, 1994-2002 
This figure plots the standard deviation of the fed funds rate for each trading day of the 
year, averaged across the nine years.  The trading days have been aligned such that the 


























Figure 2.  Investment in Money Market Mutual Funds 
This figure provides the dollar value (in billion $) invested in money market mutual funds 
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